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INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2015, in the wake of the fatal shooting of
Laquan McDonald by Chicago Police Officer Jason Van Dyke, the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois jointly initiated
an investigation into the City of Chicago’s Police Department (CPD)
and its in-house accountability agencies, the Independent Police
Review Authority (IPRA) and the Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA).
The DOJ then issued its Investigation Report, in which it concluded
that it had found reasonable cause to believe that the CPD routinely
engages in patterns or practices of using force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 The DOJ
 J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. in Russian and Slavic Studies, New York University, May 2013.
1
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILL., Investigation of the Chicago Police Department (Jan.
13, 2017).
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determined that those unlawful patterns or practices were the result of
systemic deficiencies in training and accountability. Specifically, the
DOJ found that IPRA and the BIA fail to conduct meaningful
investigations into instances of police misconduct, thereby allowing,
and implicitly encouraging, the continuation of those practices.2
Nowhere was this problem more prevalent than in predominantly
black and Latino communities.3
The DOJ’s investigation delved into racial, ethnic, and other
disparities in the CPD’s force and accountability practices, and found
that community trust has been broken by systems that have allowed
CPD officers who violate the law to escape accountability.4 The DOJ
also determined that the CPD’s accountability systems were broadly
ineffective at deterring and detecting officer misconduct, and at
holding officers accountable if and when they violate the law or CPD
policy.5 Further, because attempts by investigators to hold officers
accountable for misconduct have been frustrated by the “code of
silence”6 and the “pervasive cover-up culture”7 among CPD officers,
the potential for inappropriate coordination of testimony and risk of
collusion are effectively built into the system.8 Thus, IPRA and the
BIA accept the CPD’s culture and well-recognized code of silence as
“immutable fact[s] rather than []thing[s] to root out.”9
Though the DOJ Report focused primarily on the lack of
accountability inherent in the agencies created to review instances of
2

Id. at 145.
Id. at 144. In Chicago, black and Latino citizens account for approximately
sixty-one-percent of the city’s population. Id. at 144.
4
Id.
5
In fact, during the five years preceding the DOJ’s Investigation, the City
received over 30,000 complaints of police misconduct, yet fewer than two percent
were sustained by IPRA or the BIA. Id. at 7.
6
The City, police officers, leadership within the CPD, its police officer union,
and even the Mayor openly acknowledge that a code of silence among officers
exists. Id. at 75.
7
Id. at 47.
8
Id. at 8.
9
Id. at 47.
3
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officer misconduct, that institutional deficiency is only part of the
problem. Between 1995 and 2015, federal prosecutors nationwide
declined to levy charges against U.S. law enforcement officers alleged
to have committed civil rights violations in 12,703 of 13,233 referrals
made by the FBI and other agencies.10 That 96% rejection rate, when
contrasted with a 23% rejection rate for all other allegations of
criminal activity in the same period,11 illustrates the proverbial shield
law enforcement officials enjoy against accountability in our justice
system.12
As a result of those institutional deficiencies, the burden of
deterring police misconduct has effectively fallen on the victims
themselves. Not only is this result fundamentally unfair to those whose
rights have been violated by law enforcement, the primary tools at
those victims’ disposal13 have yet to translate into an effective system
for detecting and deterring police misconduct.14 Civil plaintiffs who
bring charges against law enforcement officers are hampered by
evidentiary and procedural difficulties, including but not limited to the
10

Brian Bowling & Andrew Conte, Trib Investigation: Cops Often Let Off
Hook for Civil Rights Complaints, TRIB LIVE (Mar. 12, 2016, 6:00 PM),
http://triblive.com/usworld/nation/9939487-74/police-rights-civil.
11
Id.
12
Craig Futterman, founder of the Civil Rights and Police Accountability
Project at the University of Chicago opined that “[t]his is an area where the feds
need to be bolder and put greater resources in . . . [i]ndeed the failure to aggressively
bring those cases has allowed too many abusive officers to believe that they can
operate without fear of punishment.” Brian Bowling & Andrew Conte, supra note
10.
13
42 U.S.C. §1983 and state law claims brought pursuant to that statute’s
purpose.
14
See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination
Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 548 (citing longitudinal studies conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center on summary judgment that show a particularly high rate of
termination by summary judgment in civil rights and employment discrimination
cases (70% and 73%, respectively)—the highest of any type of federal civil case—
and opining that these trends raise important questions as to whether meritorious
cases are being decided and dismissed on incomplete factual records in the federal
courts).
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established “code of silence” among police officers and exceptionally
high procedural burdens shouldered by civil rights plaintiffs in the pretrial stages of litigation.15 These two factors combined often turn
§1983 suits into credibility contests, with one party enjoying great
deference based on the authority vested in an officer displaying a star
over his or her heart. Yet while the improper, perfunctory grant of
deference to police officers has been mistakenly cited as an issue that
plagues citizens serving on the jury, that cognitive bias has shown to
often affect judges at the federal level.16
Judges have traditionally followed three basic restrictive rules
on the motion for summary judgment: the evidence is to be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the credibility of witnesses
is not to be evaluated, and contradictory evidence is not to be
weighed.”17 Yet federal court judges have read the Supreme Court’s
1986 “Summary Judgment Trilogy,”18 as a directive to be more
receptive to summary judgment in ways that are more striking than
anything actually articulated in those three cases.19 As a result, judges
have stepped into the role of the jury, effectively removing an essential
element of our adversarial system through procedural mechanisms.
Not only has this practice resulted in judgments against plaintiffs in an
unprecedented number of civil rights cases at the summary judgment

15

Id. at 520 (noting that it is widely recognized that civil rights plaintiffs face
enormous hurdles in federal court and, as a result, there appears to be a disparate
impact on employment discrimination and civil rights cases).
16
Schneider, supra note 14, at 564-66 (listing cognitive bias, lack of judicial
humility, incapacity to see issues outside their own perspective, and deep skepticism
of civil rights cases as factors that help explain the results of the 2009 Clermont &
Schwab study, which revealed that jury trials result in considerably more favorable
verdicts for civil rights plaintiffs than bench trials).
17
Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clinches Eroding Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments? 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 982, 1057-58.
18
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574 (1986).
19
Miller, supra note 17, at 1071.
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stage,20 it also runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tolan v.
Cotton just three years ago.21
In Tolan, the Court chastised the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for failing to “adhere to the axiom that in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the
nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.”22 The Court’s harsh criticism of the Fifth Circuit
in Tolan should have served as a much needed reminder to federal
judges across the nation as it explicitly stated that “though [the Court]
is not equipped to correct every perceived error coming from the lower
federal courts,” it “felt compelled to intervene in Tolan’s case”
because “the opinion below reflect[ed] a clear misapprehension of
summary judgment standards in light of [its] precedents.”23
Yet the Fifth Circuit is not alone. The Seventh Circuit similarly
misapplied the summary judgment standard in Colbert v. City of
Chicago, et al.,24 when it affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant Chicago police officers despite
numerous disputes over facts material to the plaintiffs’ respective
claims. In Colbert, the Seventh Circuit majority failed to review the
lower court’s legal conclusions de novo and stepped into the role
traditionally reserved for the jury, taking it upon themselves to resolve
credibility disputes in favor of the police officer-defendants, which
effectively transformed officer testimony into undisputed facts in the
record at the summary judgment stage.
Thus, while the Court’s expansion of summary judgment as a
procedural tool was designed to control both the volume of litigation
overall and its scope in any particular case, federal judges across the
nation have used that mechanism to supplant the role of the jury in our
20

Schneider, supra note 14, at 520 (noting that the greater impact of the
change in the landscape of federal pretrial practice is the dismissal of civil rights and
employment discrimination cases from federal courts in disproportionate numbers).
21
Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014).
22
Id. at 1863, citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (1986).
23
Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1868.
24
Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al., 851 F. 3d 649 (7th Cir. 2017).
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justice system.25 Though this degradation of the adversarial system
through misapplication of the summary judgment standard has
undoubtedly reached all types of claims, nowhere is it more prevalent
or more unjust than in the context of claims brought by minority
plaintiffs against those acting under the color of law.26
This article uses Colbert to examine the ways in which our
justice system deteriorates when judges usurp the role of the jury at the
pretrial stages of litigation, especially in the context of civil rights
claims. Nowhere is this improper use of judicial authority more
prevalent, or more harmful, than in the Seventh Circuit, which has
jurisdiction in most cases involving the City of Chicago and its law
enforcement officers. This article concludes by contending that, in
light of the DOJ’s warnings about the pervasiveness of police
25

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Scott v. Harris provides a dramatic
example of this problem. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Scott involved a §1983 action
brought by a motorist against the police and other officials claiming that those
officials used excessive force during a high-speed chase in violation of his Fourth
Amendment Rights. Id. at 375-76. The district court denied defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 376. On certiorari,
eight Justices reversed the denial and entered judgment for the defendant after
watching a videotape of the chase. Id. at 386. Those justices concluded that “no
reasonable jury” could find for the plaintiff, which triggered a vigorous dissent from
Justice Stevens. Id. at 379-80. In that dissent, Justice Stevens referred to the Justices
in the majority as “my colleagues on the jury,” Id. at 392 (Stevens, J, dissenting),
and criticized the Court for having “usurped the jury’s factfinding function and, in
doing so, implicitly labeling the four other judges to review the case unreasonable.”
Id. at 395. He further noted that “if two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently
about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it
seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s
characterization of events.” Id. at 396; see also Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman &
Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 894-902 (2009) (discussing
the importance of “judicial humility”).
26
Schneider, supra note 14, at 542-43 (noting that because civil rights cases
often involve subtle issues of credibility, inferences, and close legal questions, where
issues concerning the “genuineness” and “materiality” of the facts are frequently
intertwined with law, a single district judge may be a less fair decisionmaker than
jurors, who are likely to be far more diverse and to bring a broader range of
perspectives to bear on the problem).

6
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misconduct and the ineffectiveness of the CPD’s accountability
systems, the Seventh Circuit must resist the temptation to grant
improper deference to Chicago Police Department officers, redouble
its efforts to properly evaluate summary judgment orders, and reverse
them in cases in which plaintiffs have raised genuine issues of material
fact that, if taken as true as required by Rule 56, would allow a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that those plaintiffs’ rights were
violated by those officers.
Part I of this article discusses the private civil remedies
available to plaintiffs who have suffered civil rights violations by law
enforcement, specifically those brought by the respective plaintiffs in
Colbert—42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Illinois common law intentional
tort of malicious prosecution—and the unintended consequences of the
Supreme Court’s transformation of the summary judgment standard
since its inception. Part II provides an overview of the factual and
procedural background of Colbert v. Willingham, et al.27 Part III
examines the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Chicago Police Officers on all counts. Part IV then discusses the
Seventh Circuit majority’s opinion in Colbert v. City of Chicago, et
al., contrasting it with that of Judge David Hamilton, who dissented in
part. Finally, Part IV applauds Judge Hamilton for avoiding the
temptation to step into the role reserved exclusively for juries in
American jurisprudence, and argues that his approach ensures fairness
to parties seeking to enforce the protections guaranteed by our
Constitution and is consistent with the Supreme Court’s summary
judgment precedent and the stated goals of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

27

Colbert v. Willingham, et al., No. 13 Civ. 2397, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015).
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BACKGROUND
A. Private Civil Remedies Available to Civil Rights Plaintiffs
1. 42 U.S.C. §1983
Section 1983 was enacted on April 20, 1871 as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, and was the first statute to create a federal claim
for civil rights violations.28 Later amended and codified, the Act
affords a civil cause of action for any person deprived of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or
other federal law by another person who was acting under color of any
state law, statute, ordinance, custom or usage.29 Section 1983 is not
itself a source of substantive rights, but rather provides a vehicle for
the vindication of rights elsewhere conferred. Some of the most
common claims brought pursuant to §1983, and those upon which this
article is focused, are claims predicated on the Fourth Amendment,
which protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”30
Despite the formal recognition of this private remedy for
violations of federal law, however, civil suits brought pursuant to
§1983 were a rarity until the Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in
Monroe v. Pape.31 In Monroe, the Court for the first time explicitly
stated that the “under color of” provision of §1983 applied as well to
unconstitutional actions taken without state authority as to
28

42 U.S.C. §1983 (2012).
Id.
30
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
31
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (reversing the Seventh Circuit’s
dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim brought against several Chicago police officers who
searched plaintiffs’ home and arrested them without a warrant, holding that the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth
Amendment was applicable to the states by reason of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment) (overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
29

8
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unconstitutional action authorized by the state.3233 Further, in 1998, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Ramirez broadened its traditional
determination of what may constitute an unreasonable search pursuant
to §1983 to encompass the manner in which that search was
conducted.34 Noting that the “general touchstone of reasonableness
which governs Fourth Amendment analysis governs the method of
execution of the warrant,” the Court concluded that “excessive or
unnecessary destruction of property during a search may violate the
Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the
fruits of the search not subject to suppression.”35
In order to establish actionable individual liability under
§1983, the Supreme Court has held that “it is enough to show that the
official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a
federal right.”3637 The Seventh Circuit has echoed the Court’s
32

Monroe, 365 U.S. at 236.
The increased availability of federal remedies for plaintiffs whose
Constitutional rights had been violated by persons acting under color of state law
was enhanced by the codification of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of
1976, which allows the award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to the “prevailing
party” in certain civil rights cases, including those brought pursuant to §1983. Courts
have since routinely held that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’
fees unless special circumstances would render an award unjust, thereby allowing
poor plaintiffs adequate representation and civil rights attorneys an opportunity to
take cases that may result in minimal monetary damages. This practice reflects the
Supreme Court’s view that when a plaintiff succeeds in remedying a civil rights
violation, he serves “as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011). Fee shifting
pursuant to §1988, the Court noted, “at once reimburses plaintiff for ‘what it cost
him to vindicate civil rights,’ Riverside v. Riviera, 477 U.S. 561, 577-78 (1986), and
holds to account ‘a violator of federal law.’” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978).
34
United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
35
Id. at 71.
36
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
37
If, however, the officer-defendant claims the doctrine of qualified immunity,
the respective plaintiff must prove: (1) the officer-defendant’s conduct violated a
constitutional right; and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of its
alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Pearson v.
33

9
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standard, requiring an affirmative link between the misconduct
complained of and the official sued.38 Individual liability has also
been extended to those who, acting under color of state law, ignored a
realistic opportunity to intervene while other officers acted illegally.39
Despite the expansion of the ways in which a party may bring a
§1983 claim against officers who have conducted an unreasonable
search, plaintiffs bringing such claims nevertheless run into practical
problems. In such circumstances, and pursuant to standard police
protocol, plaintiffs are typically restrained and moved away from the
officers conducting the search. While arguably necessary in most
cases, that practice also effectively immunizes officers from property
damage claims by preventing a prospective plaintiff from observing
the officer responsible for the damage. As a result of the competing
interests inherent in successfully showing an “affirmative link”
between the named officer-defendant and the alleged misconduct in
such circumstances, federal circuit courts of appeals vary greatly on
exactly what a prospective plaintiff should be required to plead and/or
prove in order to satisfy the individual liability requirement under
§1983.
In fact, the Seventh Circuit itself seems to differentiate
analogous cases with little to no explanation, requiring detailed
identification in some cases,40 while accepting general identification in
others.41 In an attempt to aid prospective plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit
has suggested that a plaintiff might allege a “conspiracy of silence
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (reconsidering the Saucier procedure, holding
that while the sequence set forth therein is often appropriate, it should no longer be
regarded as mandatory in all cases). The inquiry turns on the “objective legal
reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly
established at the time it was undertaken,” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244, and must be
analyzed “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
38
Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F. 2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983).
39
Miller v. Smith, 220 F. 3d 491 (7th Cir. 2000).
40
See Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F. 3d 963 (7th Cir. 2003); Hessel
v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299 (7th Cir. 1992).
41
See Miller, 220 F. 3d 491.

10
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among the officers”42 in order to strengthen a claim against individual
officers, yet has only found that allegation to be essential in certain
circumstances, giving little to no guidance as to when a plaintiff is so
required.
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, by contrast, have offered an
alternative approach that restores the balance of power between civil
rights plaintiffs and police officer defendants.43 Recognizing the
inherent imbalance of power between police officer defendants and
civil rights plaintiffs, federal courts in those circuits allow the burden
of production to shift to defendant-officers at the discovery stage of
litigation, while leaving the ultimate burden of proof with the civil
rights plaintiff in the §1983 context.44 Pursuant to that approach, the
Sixth Circuit has held that once a plaintiff has named certain officers
as being liable for the deprivation of his or her constitutional rights
either directly or by ignoring a reasonable opportunity to intervene in
their fellow officers’ misconduct, those officers are required to then
come forth with evidence that negates that plaintiff’s allegation.45 The
Ninth Circuit has echoed that approach, shifting the burden of
production to defendants in cases in which the respective plaintiff
cannot learn the identity of the officers involved in the alleged
misconduct due to those officers’ own conduct.46

42

See Molina, 325 F. 3d at 974; see also Hessel, 977 F. 2d at 305 (affirming
summary judgment for defendant officers, despite recognizing the plaintiffs’ “bind,”
in part because plaintiffs had “alleged no conspiracy”).
43
See e.g. Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F. 3d 610 (6th Cir. 2013); see also e.g.
Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F. 3d 965 (9th Cir. 2001).
44
Id.
45
See Burley, 729 F. 3d 610.
46
See Dubner, 266 F. 3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff may
make a prima facie case simply by showing that her arrest was conducted without a
valid warrant, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to provide some
evidence that the arresting officers had probable cause).

11
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2. Malicious Prosecution
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit to disallow an
individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure to continue beyond legal process so as to permit a federal
malicious prosecution claim premised on the Fourth Amendment.47
Thus, while 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides a legal remedy for the violation
of constitutional rights conferred in the Fourth Amendment, those
within the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction who seek compensation based
on the initiation of unlawful criminal proceedings must bring a state
common law claim for the intentional tort of malicious prosecution.
Police officers may be held liable for malicious prosecution if
they either signed a criminal complaint or “played a significant role in
causing the prosecution of the plaintiff, provided all of the elements of
the tort are present.”48 To state a claim for malicious prosecution under
Illinois law, plaintiffs must establish: (1) the commencement or
continuance of an original proceeding by the defendant; (2) the
termination of that proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence
of probable cause; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages.49 The
absence of any one of those elements bars a plaintiff from pursuing the
claim,50 and of those five elements, plaintiffs bringing malicious
prosecution claims routinely encounter evidentiary and procedural
difficulties in all but the issue of damages.51
47

See Eric J. Wunsch, Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment—
Malicious Prosecution and 1983: Is There a Constitutional Violation Remediable
under Section 1983, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 878 (1994-1995); see also
Albright v. Oliver, 975 F. 2d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 266
(1994) (affirming Seventh Circuit’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint because
Illinois provides a tort remedy for malicious prosecution, thereby negating the need
for a federal remedy).
48
Rodgers v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 340, 348-49
(2000), citing 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution §§ 18, 19 (1987).
49
Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 512 (1996).
50
Id.
51
See Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 177 Ill. 2d 267,
286 (1997) (noting that the elements requiring favorable termination of a plaintiff’s
criminal proceeding and malice are “no easy hurdle for the plaintiff” and that “[a]n

12
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Under Illinois law, prosecution for a misdemeanor may be
commenced by indictment, information, or complaint,52 while
prosecution for a felony is initiated only by information or indictment,
the former of which requires a finding of probable cause at a
preliminary hearing.53 The sole purpose of preliminary proceedings is
to ascertain whether a crime charged has been committed and, if so,
whether there is probable cause to believe that it was committed by the
accused.54 Yet because the standard applied to preliminary hearings is
not the same as that applied in a criminal defendant’s subsequent trial,
“a finding of probable cause [at a preliminary hearing] is not binding
upon the subsequent grand jury.”55
In a presumed effort to better articulate what is required in
order to establish a defendant officer’s initiation of criminal
proceedings, the Seventh Circuit has effectively placed an extra hurdle
before plaintiffs bringing those claims against police officer
defendants, supported at least in part by a footnote in Justice
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Albright v. Oliver.56 Accordingly,
conceding that “it is conceivable that a wrongful arrest could be the
first step towards a malicious prosecution,” the Seventh Circuit
requires plaintiffs to establish a “chain of causation” between a police
officer’s actions and a State’s Attorney’s resultant prosecution. An
established “chain of causation,” however, is broken by an indictment,

action for malicious prosecution remains one that is disfavored in law.”); see also
Louis A. Lehr, Jr., PREMISES LIABILITY 3D §2:18 (2014 ed.) (stating “[m]alicious
prosecution is one of the most difficult causes of action to prove and many cases go
down in flames by a directed verdict if not sooner by a summary judgment.”).
52
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/111-2 (LexisNexis 2017).
53
Id.
54
People v. Morris, 30 Ill. 2d 406, 411 (1964).
55
Id.
56
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 n.5 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(“a malicious prosecution action against police officers is anomalous,” because
“[t]he principal player in carrying out a prosecution – in ‘the formal commencement
of a criminal proceeding,’ – is not police officer but prosecutor.”).

13
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as the indictment is presumed to have been supported by probable
cause.57
While “prima facie probable cause” is established by the grand
jury’s return of the indictment, “it is not conclusive evidence of
probable cause.”58 Rather, that presumption may be rebutted by
evidence such as proof that the indictment was obtained by false or
fraudulent testimony before the grand jury, or by failing to make a full
or complete statement of the facts, or by other improper or fraudulent
means.”59 Yet, because the issue of probable cause is litigated months
after the arrest, an arresting officer can merely deny a plaintiff’s claim
and is afforded time to gather evidence that could arguably and
retroactively support his defense of probable cause.
Additionally, for malicious prosecution purposes, criminal
proceedings do not terminate, and a criminal defendant’s malicious
prosecution claim does not accrue “until such time as the State [is]
precluded from seeking reinstatement of the charges,”60 which the
Supreme Court of Illinois has held is consistent with the expiration of
the statutory speedy-trial period.61 Illinois courts have parsed through
the various dispositions that can arise from preliminary hearings,
concluding that “a favorable termination is limited to only those legal
57

The question of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. Whether
the circumstances showing probable cause are proven is a question of fact, but, if
true, whether they amount to probable cause is a question of law to be decided by the
court. Ely v. National Super Markets, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d 752, 758 (1986); see also
Norris v. Ferro, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32722, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2009)
(noting the Seventh Circuit’s statement in Askew v. City of Chicago that “material”
inconsistencies create jury questions, and denying summary judgment on false arrest
claim where questions regarding defendant officer’s “credibility” were “so
substantial that at the summary judgment stage,” the court could not accept any of
his testimony).
58
Freides v. Sani-Mode Mfg. Co., 33 Ill. 2d 291, 296 (1965).
59
54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution, § 35 (1987); Freides, 33 Ill. 2d at 296
(emphasis added).
60
Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 104 (2004).
61
Every person in custody in [Illinois] for an alleged offense shall be tried by
the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into
custody. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a).
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dispositions that can give rise to an inference of lack of probable
cause.”62 Importantly, “an order of dismissal for lack of probable
cause is not an acquittal and is not final, as the State may later indict
the accused or submit a new information.”63
Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s “chain of causation” requirement
appears to summarily demand a plaintiff prove most of the elements of
the claim for malicious prosecution in one fell swoop, thereby
providing numerous loopholes through which a plaintiff may fall. That
high burden for plaintiffs is further compounded by the “liberalized”
standards applied to summary judgment, which have resulted in an
imbalance of power between plaintiffs and defendants, particularly in
cases where defendant police officers are the movants against
plaintiffs alleging officer misconduct in violation of their
constitutional rights.
B. Summary Judgment
At its inception, as articulated by the Supreme Court, summary
judgment was designed to protect courts from “frivolous defen[s]es”
and “to defeat attempts to use formal pleading as a means to delay the
recovery of just demands.”64 The codification of the Federal Rules of
Civil in 1938, however, expanded the application of the summary
judgment motion, making it available as a broad-scale tool for the
entry of a final decree on the merits of all claims before the federal
courts.65 This significant alteration of American jurisprudence was
treated warily by federal judges, who collectively perceived it as
“threatening a denial of such fundamental guarantees as the right to
confront witnesses, the right of the jury to make inferences and

62

Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 278

(1997).
63

People v. Zook, 177 Ill. App. 3d 62, 63 (1988).
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902).
65
Id. at 76.
64
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determinations of credibility, and the right to have one’s cause
advocated by counsel before a jury.”66
Prior to the 1986 Trilogy, the leading summary judgment case
was Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., which involved a conspiracy claim
arising out of the refusal of luncheonette service to, and subsequent
arrest of, a white civil rights worker in Mississippi. 67 The record
contained allegations that the arresting policeman had been in the store
when service was refused, but the plaintiff offered no specific
evidence as to any conspiratorial activity. Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment was nevertheless properly denied, the Court held,
because “the affidavits of record did not foreclose a possible inference
of a conspiracy by the jury from the fact that the policeman was
present at the time that service was refused.”68 Accordingly, under the
standard developed in Adickes, both the burden of proof and the full
burden of production on the motion for summary judgment fell on the
movant.69
The first of the Court’s Trilogy, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
fundamentally altered the Adickes standard by recasting the moving
party’s burden of production to comport with the ultimate burden of
proof the movant would have at trial.70 In so doing, the Court opened
the door to pretrial adjudication on the merits, regardless of whether
the district court judge would be constitutionally empowered to sit as
66

Id. at 77.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In fact, it has been said
that, despite the liberalization of the summary judgment motion after the Supreme
Court’s 1986 Trilogy, Adickes was the key precedent for the Court’s decision in
Tolan v. Cotton, discussed infra, because it was “the quintessential ‘he said, she
said’ summary judgment case.” Denise K. Berry, Snap Judgment: Recognizing the
Propriety and Pitfalls of Direct Judicial Review of Audiovisual Evidence at
Summary Judgment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3343, 3346 (2015).
68
Adickes, 398 U.S. at 153 (the Court stated that such an inference could not
be foreclosed from the factual allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, finding that
the defendant had failed to carry its burden of showing the absence of any genuine
issue of fact).
69
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J., 73, 81 (1990).
70
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
67
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the ultimate trier of fact at trial. The Court’s transformation of the
motion for summary judgment did not stop there. Rather, while the
Court’s holding in Celotex facilitated the process of bringing a
summary judgment motion before the court, its subsequent decisions
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.71 and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.72 increased the chances of a trial court granting
summary judgment in favor of a defendant-movant by allowing broad
pretrial evidentiary review, thereby expanding the discretionary
authority given to the district courts.73
In Anderson, the Court recast summary judgment into the mold
of a motion for a directed verdict.74 Yet as Justice William J. Brennan
observed in his dissenting opinion, that approach marked a significant
departure from the traditional view that “the measurement of the
‘caliber and quality’ of evidence ‘could only be performed by
weighing the evidence.’”75 Accordingly, Justice Brennan concluded
that the Court’s opinion was full of language which he feared “could
surely be understood as an invitation–if not an instruction–to trial
courts to assess and weigh evidence as much as a juror would.”7677
71

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
73
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 69, 84.
74
Miller, supra note 17, at 44-45 (noting that the Court’s decision in Anderson
allows a district court to enter judgment if the evidence produced by the plaintiff is
not sufficient to convince the judge that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in
his favor).
75
Id. at 266 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
76
Id. (emphasis added).
77
Motions for summary judgment after the Trilogy have presented a
fundamental conundrum: issues of credibility are supposed to be decided by the jury,
but in order to decide if the proof is enough for a “reasonable juror,” the judge must
implicitly decide issues of credibility. The impetus of Justice Brennan’s point was
that he could not at once “square the direction that the judge ‘is not himself to weigh
the evidence’ with the direction that the judge also bear in mind the ‘quantum’ of
proof required and consider whether the evidence is of sufficient ‘caliber and
quantity’ to meet that ‘quantum.’” Id. Further, Justice Brennan feared that the
Court’s holding would transform what is meant to provide an expedited “summary”
procedure into a full-blown paper trial on the merits. Id. at 266-67. This fear seems
72
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Moreover, in Matsushita, the Court reached into the realm of
fact-finding in upholding a grant of summary judgment against the
plaintiffs despite the submission of detailed and unrebutted expert
reports supporting plaintiffs’ claims.78 The Court’s holding triggered
yet another vigorous dissent, this time by Justice Byron White, who
read the majority opinion to be an “invitation to the district judge to go
beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for
himself whether the weight of the evidence favors the [non-moving
party].”79
Thus, while the Court’s liberalization of the summary
judgment standard was intended to control both the volume and scope
of litigation in any particular case, the Trilogy’s impact has gone far
beyond this desired screening.80 One of the unanticipated
consequences of the Trilogy has been the alteration in the balance of
power between plaintiffs and defendants in the pretrial phases of
litigation. The Trilogy tipped this balance in favor of defendants by
raising both the costs and risks to plaintiffs while diminishing both for
defendants, who as a class tend to be wealthier and more powerful
than plaintiffs and are typically the beneficiaries of summary
judgment.81 Accordingly, summary judgment after the Trilogy remains
a “powerful but blunt instrument,”82 as it is not sufficiently finelyhoned to distinguish sharply between genuine strike suits,83 and cases
properly placed in the civil rights context, where jury trials result in considerably
more favorable verdicts for civil rights plaintiffs than bench trials. Schneider, supra
note 14, at 564.
78
See Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
79
Id. at 600 (White, J. dissenting).
80
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 69, at 74; Bouillion v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 677 F. Supp. 467, 471 (W.D. La. 1988) (quoting Norris v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, 495 So. 2d 976, 982 (La. App. 1986), cert. denied, 499 So. 2d 85 (La.
1987)).
81
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 69, at 75; Miller, supra note 17, at
47-48.
82
Id. at 107.
83
Cases initiated with the intention of extorting a payment from the defendant
by threatening a costly legal battle. Issacharoff & Loewestein, supra note 69, at 106.
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of limited monetary value.84 Many lawsuits aimed at remedying
constitutional violations fall squarely into the latter category.
More importantly, critics of the Trilogy have argued that, in
deciding those three cases, the Court conferred too much discretion
upon trial judges, essentially transforming them into pretrial
factfinders.85 A post-Trilogy review of lower court decisions proves
that courts have shown a new willingness to resolve issues of intent or
motive at the summary judgment stage, and, in the extreme version, to
grant summary judgment where “taken as a whole, [plaintiff’s
evidence does not] exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a fair
amount of certainty.”86 In fact, considerable evidence supports the
proposition that federal courts across the nation have taken Matsushita
and Anderson as the invitation the respective dissenting justices so
feared.87 This development is particularly troubling in civil rights
cases, which most commonly involve subtle issues of credibility,
inferences taken from circumstantial evidence, and close legal
questions.88
Although the tension between the procedure’s screening value
and the desire to protect the nonmovant has always been present in
motions brought pursuant to Rule 50, it is heightened in the summary
judgment context because of the more limited evidentiary record and
the lack of any opportunity to evaluate witness credibility.89 When
84

Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 69, at 107.
Miller, supra note 17, 47-48.
86
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 69, 89.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Miller, supra note 17, at 61; see also UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F. 2d
871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990) (holding, in the
context of a sex discrimination case challenging the exclusion of women of childbearing age from industrial positions, that despite the conflicts on material issues
absolutely central to the disputed exclusion, the plaintiffs failed to survive summary
judgment). Judge Posner dissented, opining, “I think it a mistake to suppose that we
can decide this case once and for all on so meager a record,” before emphasizing that
“whether a particular policy is unlawful is a question of fact that should ordinarily be
resolved at trial.” Id. at 902, 906. The Supreme Court agreed, reversing and
remanding that case in part because “if the Court of Appeals had properly analyzed
85
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viewing evidentiary material on a pretrial motion without the
safeguards and environment of a trial setting, courts may be tempted to
treat the evidence in a piecemeal rather than cumulative fashion, draw
inferences against the nonmoving party, or discount the nonmoving
party’s evidence by weighing it against contradictory evidence.90
Further, today’s rhetoric about the “litigation explosion”91 may be
encouraging district courts and courts of appeals to rely on the Trilogy
to justify resorting to pretrial disposition too readily because they
believe that there is a pressing need to alleviate overcrowded dockets
or because they disfavor certain substantive claims.92
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tolan v. Cotton,
however, evidences the Court’s renewed emphasis on the proper role
of a district court in the summary judgment stages of litigation,
especially in civil rights cases involving purely testimonial evidence.93
the evidence, it would have concluded that summary judgment against petitioners
was not appropriate because there was a dispute over a material issue of fact.” Int’l
Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 222 (1991).
90
Miller, supra note 17, at 62. Miller goes on to say that, “[e]ncouraged by
systemic concerns suggesting that summary judgment is desirably efficient, judges
may be motivated to seek out weaknesses in the nonmovant’s evidence, effectively
reversing the historic approach.” Id. at 66.
91
Miller, supra note 17, at 110.
92
Id. Miller also notes that “[j]udges are human, and their personal sense of
whether a plaintiff’s claims seem ‘implausible’ can subconsciously infiltrate even
the more careful analysis.” Id. at 66.
93
In Tolan, an officer stopped Tolan in front of his parents’ home in Bellaire,
Texas on the mistaken belief that the car he had been driving with his cousin was
stolen. 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014). Tolan told the officers that the car belonged to
him, and after a few minutes, Tolan’s parents, hearing the commotion, came outside.
Id. His parents reiterated what Tolan had already told the officer and confirmed that
Tolan lived with them. Id. A sergeant then arrived on the scene and ordered Tolan’s
mother to stand against the garage door. Id. at 1863-64. The officer stated that Tolan
rose to his feet from the facedown position in which the officer had ordered Tolan to
remain, while Tolan testified that he rose to his knees. Id. at 1864. The parties agreed
that Tolan then exclaimed “Get your fucking hands off my mom,” at which point the
sergeant on scene shot Tolan three times. Id. Granting summary judgment to the
officer-defendants, the district court relied on several disputed facts, including (1)
the lighting of the porch, (2) how calmly Tolan’s mother disputed the officers’
allegations, (3) whether Tolan was “verbally threatening” the officer, and (4)
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The facts of Tolan, as viewed by the Court, led to the inescapable
conclusion that the court below credited the evidence of the party
seeking summary judgment—police officers—and failed to properly
acknowledge key evidence offered by the party opposing that
motion—a young black man shot at the hands of one of those officers.
It is natural, the Court noted, for witnesses on both sides to have their
own “perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases,”94 but, the
Court continued, “by weighing the evidence and reaching factual
inferences contrary to Tolan’s competent evidence, the court below
neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary
judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party.”95 Failing to heed the Court’s warnings in Tolan,
both the district court and the Seventh Circuit majority neglected to
adhere to that same fundamental procedural tenet when it issued its
opinion in Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al. just three years later.
COLBERT V. WILLINGHAM, ET AL.
A. Factual Background
In March of 2011, Plaintiff Jai Crutcher was discharged on
mandatory supervised release after being incarcerated periodically for
various offenses.96 After his release, Crutcher and his girlfriend moved
in with Christopher Colbert, Crutcher’s brother by adoption, who lived
in the West Englewood neighborhood of Chicago.97 As part of the
terms of his supervised release, Crutcher was required to “consent to a
whether Tolan was “moving to intervene” in the sergeant’s interaction with his
mother. Id. at 1867. Because the lower court failed to credit evidence that
contradicted some of its key factual conclusions, the Court found that the Fifth
Circuit improperly “weighed evidence” and “resolved disputed issues in favor of the
moving party.” Id. at 1866.
94
Id. at 1868.
95
Id.
96
Colbert v. Willingham et al., No. 13 Civ. 2397, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67561, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015).
97
Id.
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search of [his] person, property, or residence”98 and agreed that he
“w[ould] not use or knowingly have under [his] control or in [his]
residence any firearms, ammunition, or explosive devices.”99
Shortly after Crutcher was released on parole, Defendant
Chicago Police Officer Russel Willingham (“Willingham”) allegedly
received information from a “cooperating individual” who claimed to
have seen Crutcher in Colbert’s residence with two firearms: a 12gauge shotgun and a 40-caliber handgun.100 Defendant Willingham ran
a name check on Crutcher, which revealed that he was on parole for
the use of a firearm.101 Based exclusively on that information,
Willingham contacted Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
Parole Officer Jack Tweedle (“Tweedle”), and the two decided to
conduct a parole check of Crutcher’s residence to ensure that he was in
compliance with the terms of his supervised release.102
At 6:30 a.m. on March 31, 2011, no fewer than 10 police and
parole officers arrived at Colbert’s home to conduct that compliance
check.103 Asleep in the basement at the time, Crutcher woke to the
officers’ knock on the front door of the residence he shared with
Colbert.104 Willingham, Tweedle, and IDOC Officers Luis Hopkins
and Darryl Johnson (collectively, “Defendant Officers”), were among
the group of agents.105 Crutcher looked outside and, seeing the
enormous police presence, called Colbert at work to apprise him of the
officers’ arrival. Crutcher let the officers in “several minutes later” and
consented to the search pursuant to the terms of his supervised
release.106

98

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *3.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2017).
104
Id. at *4.
105
Id.
106
Id.
99
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Before beginning the search, the officers handcuffed
Crutcher.107 At some point during the search, Colbert arrived home
and was also placed in handcuffs.108 As a result, neither Colbert nor
Crutcher was permitted to observe the search, which encompassed the
totality of the home.109 While both Plaintiffs were handcuffed and
secured, the reporting officers ravaged the home, causing damage to
both real and personal property.110
Specifically, the officers pulled out insulation in the basement,
put holes in the walls, ripped the couch open to search its contents, and
tracked dog feces throughout the house.111 In the kitchen on the main
floor, officers ransacked various food containers (i.e. a sugar bowl),
broke part of the kitchen countertop, and broke hinges off of
shelves.112 Additionally, Plaintiffs described an officer who unholstered his firearm and threatened to shoot Crutcher’s six-week-old
puppy before leaving the dog outside, where it was lost.113
Just before concluding their search, the officers encountered the
bedroom Colbert shared with his wife on the main floor, which was
locked.114 The officers obtained a key and, once inside, found a 12gauge shotgun in the closet with approximately 100 rounds of
ammunition and a box for a 40-caliber semi-automatic handgun.115
Colbert admitted ownership of both firearms, neither of which was
107

Id.
Id. at *4-5.
109
Id. at *42.
110
Id. at *5.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F. 3d 649, 661 (7th Cir. 2017) (Hamilton,
J., dissenting). In addition to the property damage referenced by the district court,
Plaintiffs testified that the officers damaged clothing, a weight bench, the basement
door, the steps, bedroom dressers, and an electronic tablet. Crutcher testified that the
officers dismantled his stereo and television, damaging them in the process, and
destroyed photographs of his grandmother, leaving them on the floor covered in dog
feces. Colbert, 651 F. 3d at 661, n.1 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
114
Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *5.
115
Id. at *6.
108
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registered with the City of Chicago, at which point the officers
formally arrested both Colbert and Crutcher.116
B. Procedural Background
Crutcher was arrested for Unlawful Use of a Weapon/Felon in
Possession of a Firearm117 and Violation of Parole.118 Officer
Willingham prepared and submitted a criminal complaint against
Crutcher in which he stated that Crutcher had admitted to “full
knowledge of the firearm being in the residence” as well as to
knowledge that a handgun had previously been in the residence.119
That prosecution ended on April 19, 2011, after a Cook County judge
dismissed the case on a finding of no probable cause,120 but on May 6,
2011, an Illinois grand jury nevertheless indicted Crutcher on one
count of being an armed habitual criminal and two counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon.121 Crutcher was found not guilty on
February 28, 2012, but only after being incarcerated for a total of
approximately eleven months.122
Colbert was arrested for failing to register his firearm pursuant
to §8-20-140 of Chicago’s Municipal Code123 and an accompanying
116

Id.
Required Crutcher to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his
land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any firearm or firearm
ammunition. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-1.1(a) (LexisNexis 2017).
118
Required Willingham to have reasonable suspicion that Crutcher knowingly
had a firearm or ammunition in his residence. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-3-9
(2017); Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *6.
119
Id. at *31.
120
Id. at *2.
121
Id.
122
Id., at *6-7.
123
Due to what Willingham calls “a scrivener’s error,” instead of charging
Colbert under §8-20-140, the official charge listed on Colbert’s arrest report was §820-040, a statute declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67561, at *38.
117
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state-law charge for possessing a shotgun able to hold over three
rounds pursuant to 520 ILCS 5/2.33(m).124 Colbert was released from
custody on the same day of his arrest and the criminal case against him
was later dismissed.125
Plaintiffs Crutcher and Colbert filed their first complaint with
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, on March 31, 2013,
later amending it twice.126 Colbert alleged (1) a false arrest claim
against all individual Defendant Officers, (2) that §8-20-040 of the
Municipal Code of the City of Chicago was unconstitutional, and (3)
an unreasonable search claim.127 Plaintiff Crutcher alleged (1) a false
arrest claim against all individual Defendant Officers, and (2) a
malicious prosecution claim against Willingham and the City of
Chicago.128
The City and Willingham moved for summary judgment on all
claims, arguing: (1) Willingham had the requisite probable cause to
arrest both Crutcher and Colbert or, in the alternative, Willingham had
“arguable probable cause,” entitling him to qualified immunity on the
Plaintiffs’ respective false arrest claims; (2) Crutcher’s malicious
prosecution claim against Willingham and the City with respect to
Crutcher’s first criminal proceeding was time-barred and that the
requisite “chain of causation” applied to Crutcher’s second proceeding
was broken by his indictment by the grand jury or, in the alternative,
Willingham’s arrest and subsequent criminal complaint were
supported by probable cause, barring Crutcher from relief as a matter
of law; and (3) Colbert’s unreasonable search claim failed because
there was no evidence that Willingham was personally involved in the
destruction of Colbert’s property.129
124

Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *7.
Id. at *7-8.
126
Complaint, Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561
(N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 2397).
127
Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *35.
128
Id. at *10-11.
129
See Motion of Defendants City of Chicago and Chicago Police Officer
Russel Willingham for Summary Judgment, Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394).
125
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IDOC agents Tweedle, Johnson and Hopkins also moved for
summary judgment on all claims, asserting that the agents could not be
held liable for: (1) Crutcher’s arrest because it was Willingham and
the other Chicago Police Officers who arrested Crutcher; and (2)
Colbert’s property damage claim because Colbert had failed to provide
any evidence about the condition of the property before the search and
because Colbert failed to provide any description of the officers who
allegedly damaged his property.130 Colbert and Crutcher moved for
partial summary judgment on their respective false-arrest claims
against the City.131
C. Statements of “Un”Disputed Material Facts
When ruling on motions for summary judgment, federal courts
in the Northern District of Illinois obtain the material facts of the case
from the parties’ respective Local Rule 56.1 statements.132 Those
statements filed by the respective parties in Colbert, and their answers,
collectively proved that numerous facts were in dispute between the
parties. Those which are material and therefore relevant to the
respective plaintiffs’ claims are summarized below.
First, Willingham stated that the “cooperating individual” upon
whom he relied informed him that he or she had personally seen
130

See Memorandum of Defendants Jack Tweedle, Darryl Johnson and Louis
Hopkins in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Colbert v. Willingham, et al.,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394).
131
Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May
26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394). In his motion for partial summary judgment, Colbert
for the first time asserted that the registration requirements under §8-20-140, the
ordinance actually underlying Colbert’s arrest, were unconstitutional. In response to
Colbert’s claim, Willingham submitted an affidavit stating that Colbert had been
arrested for violating §8-20-140, but Willingham had erroneously marked §8-20-040
as the cause of arrest. The district court accepted Willingham’s explanation and
granted summary judgment to Defendants on Colbert’s false arrest claim. Colbert v.
City of Chicago, et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, this article
does not discuss that claim.
132
Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F. 3d 524, 527 (7th Cir.
2000).
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Crutcher repeatedly with two firearms—a 12-gauge shotgun and a 40caliber handgun—while s/he was present in the home he shared with
Colbert.133 Willingham claimed that the individual had provided him
with reliable information in the past.134 Crutcher disputed the
individual’s reliability because Willingham could not recall how many
times he had received information from that individual prior to the
search and had not made any reports about information the individual
had provided him in the past nor the information provided to him prior
to his search of plaintiffs’ residence.135 Further, Crutcher argued that
because Willingham asserted privilege and refused to disclose what, if
anything, the individual had told him about how he or she came to be
inside of Crutcher’s residence, and also relied on that privilege to
support his refusal to disclose how many times that individual claimed
to have been inside Crutcher’s residence, the alleged “information”
was uncorroborated, and thus Willingham should have been barred
from using the evidence about the “tip” to support his “reasonable
suspicion” or “probable cause” finding(s).136
Relatedly, the parties disputed the circumstances of the
officers’ visit. First, the parties disputed the length of Crutcher’s
“delay” in answering the door. Crutcher testified it was approximately
four minutes, while the Defendant Officers claimed it was between
fifteen and twenty minutes.137 Additionally, plaintiffs disputed the true
purpose of the officers’ visit.138 Willingham claimed the purpose was
133

Defendant Chicago Police Officer Russel Willingham’s Reply to Plaintiff’s
Response to Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at
¶6, Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26,
2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394).
134
Id.
135
Plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1(b) Statement in Response to ECF #70, at ¶6,
Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015)
(No. 13 Civ. 394).
136
Id.
137
Colbert v. Willingham, et al., No. 13 Civ. 394, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67561, at *16 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015).
138
Colbert v. City of Chicago et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 666 (7th Cir. 2017)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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to ensure Crutcher was in compliance with the terms of his supervised
release with respect to gun possession, yet Crutcher stated that he
planned to dispute Willingham’s intent at trial because, as Crutcher
testified at his deposition, when Willingham first entered the home he
asked “[w]here’s the diesel?”139 and reported that he had received a tip
“that [they] had some drugs,”140 before accusing Crutcher of flushing
them down the toilet.141 Crutcher also pointed to the fact that as the
officers searched through the house, they further indicated they were
looking for drugs by looking through the sugar container in the kitchen
and tearing apart the couch in the basement where Crutcher slept as it
was unreasonable to believe guns could have been stored in either of
those objects.142
Additionally, while Willingham claimed that Crutcher had
admitted to “full knowledge of the firearm being in the residence” as
well as to knowing that a handgun had previously been in the
residence—claims he included in his arrest report—Crutcher testified
that he neither admitted to knowing nor knew that a firearm had been
in the house.143 Further, Crutcher testified that, after asking him about
drugs, Willingham told Crutcher that he knew the shotgun was
Colbert’s, but said “since you didn’t give me the information I needed,
guess what? The shotgun is yours. [Hopkins] found it on you.”144
Notably, the IDOC Defendants admitted that fact for summary
judgment purposes.145
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there was undoubtedly a
dispute over whether the named Defendant Officers were the same
officers who caused the damage to Colbert’s property or, at the very
139

“Diesel” is slang for cocaine.
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 666 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Plaintiff’s Consolidated Statement of Additional Facts, at ¶24-25, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394).
144
Id. at ¶26.
145
IDOC Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Consolidated Statement of
Additional Facts, at ¶26, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015)
(No. 13 Civ. 394).
140
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least, ignored a realistic opportunity to intervene while other officers
caused the property damage. Colbert’s second amended complaint
named all four Defendant Officers. Willingham admitted the damage
occurred, but claimed he was not personally responsible.146 The IDOC
Defendants, by contrast, claimed to have no recollection of the
incident and merely asserted a blanket denial of personal liability.147
COLBERT V. WILLINGHAM, ET AL. – THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION
A. Jai Crutcher
1. False Arrest
Beginning its analysis of Crutcher’s Fourth Amendment false
arrest claim, the district court stated that a warrantless search or
seizure of a parolee’s person or belongings “can occur where the
officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”148 Accordingly,
the relevant inquiry was whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, Willingham had reasonable suspicion that Crutcher had
committed or was committing either of the two crimes for which he
was arrested or any crime at all.149
Before answering that inquiry in the affirmative, the district
court first stated that the fact that the officers found the shotgun in
Colbert’s locked bedroom affected the analysis of whether Crutcher
knowingly resided in a home with a firearm.150 Nonetheless, the court
found that Willingham had the requisite reasonable and articulable
suspicion to support Crutcher’s arrest based on: (1) knowledge that
Crutcher was on parole for the use of a firearm, (2) information from
146

Defendant Chicago Police Officer Russel Willingham’s Reply to Plaintiff’s
Response to Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at
¶15, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394).
147
Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al., 851 F.3d 649, 662 (7th Cir. 2017)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting).
148
Id. (emphasis in the original).
149
Id.
150
Id. at *15.

29

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

29

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

an informant relating that Crutcher had been in his residence with
multiple firearms, including a shotgun, (3) the amount of time it took
Crutcher to answer the door, and (4) the discovery of corroborating
evidence (the shotgun that Defendant Officers found in Colbert’s
locked bedroom after a full search of the residence).151
In analyzing the disputed length of Crutcher’s delay in opening
the door for the officers, the court differentiated between a “significant
delay,” which would be sufficient to increase an officer’s suspicion,152
and a “two-minute delay,” which would be an immaterial fact that
would not contribute to finding reasonable suspicion, before
concluding Crutcher’s delay belonged in the former category.153
Notably, the court did not explicitly state that a four minute delay is
“significant,” nor did it explain what led to its conclusion. Instead, the
court bypassed that inquiry, the dispute over which would normally be
considered a matter of credibility, and merely asserted that the delay
was relevant “based on its duration,” Crutcher’s status as a parolee, the
tip Willingham allegedly received, and the alleged purpose of the
investigation.154 Apart from Crutcher’s parolee status, each of the
factors upon which the court relied were sources of dispute among the
parties. The court thus could not have decided the issue as a matter of
law without accepting the Defendant Officers’ version of the facts as
true.
Finally, while the district court agreed with Plaintiffs’
contention that Willingham failed to provide evidence sufficient to
establish the reliability of the “cooperating individual” from whom he
received the tip about Crutcher possession guns, and therefore treated
the individual like an anonymous tipster, the court nevertheless
concluded that the Defendant Officers’ discovery of the specific
firearm allegedly mentioned in the tip—the fruit of their search—was
151

Id.
United States v. Charleston, No. 14 CR 009, 2014 WL 1329419, at *12
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 1, 2014).
153
United States v. Crasper, 472 F. 3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007).
154
Colbert v. Willingham et al., No. 13 Civ. 2397, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67561, at *15 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015).
152
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sufficient to retroactively corroborate the tip.155 Thus, the court
seemingly used one contested fact to validate the next before
summarily concluding that no dispute of material fact remained.
2. Malicious Prosecution
Before analyzing the merits of Crutcher’s malicious
prosecution claim against Willingham and the City, the district court
resolved a dispute between the parties regarding the date Crutcher’s
claim accrued. Defendant Officers contended that Crutcher’s
malicious prosecution claim accrued on April 19, 2011, when the state
court judge issued a finding of no probable cause following Crutcher’s
preliminary hearing.156 Crutcher, by contrast, argued that his claim
accrued in February 28, 2012, when he was found not guilty of the
charges brought via his subsequent grand jury indictment.157 Thus, the
question for the court was whether the two criminal prosecutions
against Crutcher, which stemmed from the same arrest and were
premised on the same operative facts and police reports, should be
treated as separate actions or as a single action.
The district court concluded that the two prosecutions brought
against Crutcher should be considered separately, thereby time-barring
any action based on Crutcher’s first criminal proceeding.
Consequently, because the court found that “[t]he grand jury
indictment of Crutcher [was] prima facie evidence of probable cause,”
Crutcher was required to present evidence “such as proof that the
indictment was obtained by false or fraudulent testimony before the
grand jury or other improper or fraudulent means,” in the second
matter in order to rebut that presumption.158

155

Id. at *17.
Id. at *24.
157
Id. at *24.
158
Id. at *30 (citing Freides v. Sani-Mode Mfg. Co., 33 Ill. 2d 291, 296
(1965); Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F. 3d 892, 901
(7th Cir. 2001)).
156
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But by artificially separating the two criminal proceedings, the
court discounted Crutcher’s argument that the two criminal
proceedings had been initiated by one arrest and one police report for
crimes different only in degree, which left the “chain of causation”
intact. The court’s determination on that issue thus allowed it to
conclude that Crutcher’s allegation of Willingham’s “improper act”—
his drafting of a police report containing false statements regarding the
facts of Crutcher’s arrest—related only to the initial, time-barred
prosecution. Even in the light most favorable to Crutcher, the court
stated, there was no evidence that Willingham had any influence over
the grand jury’s decision to indict Crutcher in the second
proceeding.159
B. Christopher Colbert
Disagreeing with the IDOC Defendants, the court found that
because Colbert alleged specific facts describing how the police
damaged specific items within his home, and because Willingham
admitted those allegations, there existed a disputed issue of fact
materially sufficient to withstand summary judgment on those
grounds.160 Adhering to its strict individual liability standard for
claims arising under §1983, however, the district court granted
summary judgment to Defendant Officers because Colbert failed to
provide evidence sufficient to establish an affirmative link between
any individual Defendant Officer and the damage caused.161
Importantly, the court found Colbert’s argument that “[t]he question of
which officers were responsible for trashing Colbert’s home should be
left to the jury” unconvincing, citing Hessel v. O’Hearn162 for the
principle that while it may be assumed that the property damage was

159

Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *32.
Id. at *42.
161
Id. at *44.
162
Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 1992) (asserting that “the
principle of collective punishment is not generally part of our law.”).
160
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caused by one or more of the officers who searched Colbert’s home,
“[t]hat [wa]s not good enough to fend off summary judgment.”163
COLBERT V. CITY OF CHICAGO, ET AL. – THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECISION
Exhibiting the same uncritical approach to the disputed issues of
fact material to Plaintiffs’ claims and failing to review the lower
court’s ruling de novo, in Colbert v. City of Chicago et al., a divided
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Defendant Officer-Appellees. Judge Joel Flaum,
writing for the majority, was joined by Judge William Bauer, while
Judge David Hamilton concurred in part and dissented in part.164
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Jai Crutcher – Malicious Prosecution
Beginning its analysis of Crutcher’s malicious prosecution claim
with a footnote, the Seventh Circuit majority failed to review the lower
court’s treatment of Crutcher’s underlying criminal proceedings as two
separate actions despite owing no deference to the trial court’s legal
conclusion. In so doing, however, the Seventh Circuit majority both
ignored the fact that the court’s artificial separation of those
proceedings ran counter to established law and discounted the
dispositive effect of the district court’s legal conclusion by conflating
two elements of Crutcher’s claim.165
First, by failing to review the separation de novo, the majority
neglected to adhere to the axiom that criminal proceedings do not
terminate, and a criminal defendant’s malicious prosecution claim
does not accrue, “until such time as the State [is] precluded from
163

Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *45 (citing Hessel, 977 F. 2d at

305).
164
165

Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 654, n.5.
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seeking reinstatement of the charges.”166 The record explicitly showed
that the State was not only permitted to seek reinstatement of the
charges against Crutcher, but that it did in fact reinstate the charges
against Crutcher that resulted from the officers’ search of his residence
on March 31, 2011, less than one month after the circuit court judge’s
“no probable cause” finding.167
More importantly, the majority predicated its judgment as a
matter of law in favor of the Defendant Officers on the ultimate
catchall: a broken “chain of causation.”168 Because Crutcher was
subsequently indicted on charges stemming from his arrest on March
31, 2011, the court concluded that the chain of causation linking
Willingham’s arrest to Crutcher’s prosecution had been broken.169
Though the majority admitted that Willingham’s allegedly false
statement in the original case incident report he drafted constituted a
post-arrest action, it nevertheless found that there was simply no
evidence that the statement influenced the prosecutor’s decision to
indict, or that the prosecutor relied on the contents of the report to
obtain the indictment for Crutcher’s second proceeding.170 In support,
the court pointed to the fact that Willingham had not testified before
the grand jury and found that Crutcher failed to provide any evidence
connecting Willingham’s allegedly false report to the officer who did
testify.171
Yet by focusing on the fact that Crutcher pointed to no evidence
that Willingham committed perjury before the grand jury, the majority
misapprehended the ways in which plaintiffs may rebut the
presumption that an indictment is prima facie evidence of probable
cause. The Supreme Court of Illinois explicitly addressed the issue of
what may constitute a post-arrest “improper act” sufficient to leave the
chain of causation intact, stating that “[n]o decision of the court ever
166

Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 104 (2004).
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 653.
168
Id. at 654, n.5.
169
Id. at 655.
170
Id.
171
Id.
167
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has restricted the rebutting evidence solely to proof of false or
incomplete testimony” because no such “insuperable burden . . . would
serve the ends of justice.”172 The Seventh Circuit majority thus
improperly narrowed its analysis and refused to credit Crutcher’s
testimony, which supported the allegation that Willingham committed
an improper act by knowingly misrepresenting facts that satisfied a
required element of the offense for which Crutcher was subsequently
charged and indicted.
Moreover, the court went on to muse that, “it [was] likely that the
prosecutor knew that a judge had already dismissed Willingham’s
complaint, which was based in part on th[at] arrest report, for lack of
probable cause.”173 In so doing, however, the majority refused to
confront the implausibility of its assumption. A grand jury entered a
finding of no probable cause to indict Crutcher on two charges: one
which required proof that Crutcher knowingly resided in a home with
a firearm, the other which required proof that he had actual or
constructive possession of a firearm.174 Crutcher was subsequently
indicted on three charges, all of which required actual or constructive
possession.175
The record is incontrovertibly devoid of evidence prior to the
Defendant Officers’ search. Even the alleged tip which triggered
Willingham and Tweedle to conduct the search of Crutcher’s
residence failed to appear in the record until Crutcher had already been
taken into custody.176 According to the lower court, that anonymous
tip and Crutcher’s “delay” formed the requisite reasonable suspicion
for the Defendant Officers’ search, which in turn afforded them the
opportunity to find the firearms in Colbert’s locked bedroom.177 Those
facts, taken as true, would likely be sufficient to show actual
172

Friedes v. Sani-Mode Mfg. Co., 33 Ill. 2d 291, 296 (1965).
Id.
174
Id. at 653.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 666 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
177
Colbert v. Willingham, et al., No. 13 Civ. 2397, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67561, at *20-21 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015).
173
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possession. Crutcher’s false confession, in turn, supports constructive
possession.
Yet it was patently impossible for the prosecutor to discover any
one of those facts independent from Crutcher’s arrest report, where
they were all memorialized in writing by Willingham. Furthermore,
Willingham testified in his deposition that he “related the facts of the
case” to the prosecutor.178 Not one of the Defendant Officers offered
any evidence tending to prove that the prosecutor’s decision to charge
Crutcher was the result of his or her independent investigation. The
majority did not explain what evidence a prosecutor might have had to
support an indictment for possession other than the evidence that was
exclusively within Willingham’s control. Nonetheless, the court
conclusively determined that there was no evidence that Willingham’s
arrest report played any part in Crutcher’s second criminal proceeding
which stemmed from the same operative facts as the first.179
Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that the Seventh Circuit
majority remained unperturbed by the fact that the only place from
which evidence could be found supporting probable cause sufficient to
initiate and continue Crutcher’s second criminal proceeding was
within Willingham’s arrest report, which Crutcher alleged was
falsified. Consequently, the district court’s decision to separate
Crutcher’s two criminal proceedings was thus far from irrelevant.
Rather, that decision effectively barred evidence of Willingham’s
post-arrest improper act. The majority thus tacitly deferred to
Defendant Officers’ version of events, and neglected to credit
Crutcher’s sworn testimony denying the veracity of salient facts in
Willingham’s arrest report from playing any role in his malicious
prosecution claim. As a result, the presumption of probable cause
inherent in Crutcher’s indictment remained unrebutted. Consequently,
by way of a procedural technicality, the majority avoided crediting
testimony of the non-moving party, and, as a result, was not forced to
explicitly state what it implicitly had done.
178

Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22, Colbert v. City of Chicago et al. (7th Cir.
Nov. 2, 2016) (No. 16-1362).
179
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 655.

36

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/2

36

: Crediting the Incredible: How the Seventh Circuit Uses Procedure

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

2. Christopher Colbert – Unreasonable Search
Applying the test enunciated in Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist,180 the
Seventh Circuit majority found Colbert unable to satisfy §1983’s
personal liability requirement due to the lack of an affirmative link
between the individuals sued and the misconduct alleged.181
Particularly problematic for the court was the fact that Colbert sued
four of ten searching officers, while admitting that he was unable to
identify which officer had caused which type of property damage.182
Unmoved by the fact that Colbert’s failure was a direct result of his
removal from the rooms in which the officers were conducting the
search, the majority concluded that because the officers denied
personal responsibility and Colbert put forth “no evidence” to support
his claim against them, no dispute of material fact remained.183
The court did, however, recognize the “potential tension between
§1983’s individuality responsibility requirement and factual scenarios
of the kind present [in this case].”184 In its attempt to provide a
solution for that inherent problem, however, the majority merely
reiterated its prior suggestion to plaintiffs in two cases the court
believed to be factually similar. First, in Hessel v. O’Hearn, a case in
which officers allegedly stole items during a search of plaintiff’s
house, the court for the first time “recognized the plaintiff’s bind,”185
but affirmed summary judgment for defendant officers because the
plaintiffs had “alleged no conspiracy.”186 Delving into the realm of
fact-finding, the court opined that “[t]here is no more reason to fix
180

Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F. 2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
because §1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated
upon fault, “a causal connection, or affirmative link, between the misconduct
complained of and the official sued is necessary.”).
181
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 657.
182
Id. at 659.
183
Id. at 660.
184
Id. at 657.
185
Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 1992).
186
Id.
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liability on [those] 14 police officers than on the entire population of
Horicon, Wisconsin,”187 later qualifying that with “[w]ell, maybe a
little more reason.”188 Nonetheless, the court surmised that because
“[e]ach of the defendants c[ould] deny liability, a jury may find it
impossible to determine who is lying,”189 the plaintiff was not entitled
to relief as a matter of law,190 thereby evidencing a propensity to
improperly weigh evidence at the summary judgment stage.
Similarly, in Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper,191 the court
suggested that plaintiffs in such a “bind” might allege “something akin
to a ‘conspiracy of silence among the officers,’ in which defendants
refuse to disclose which of them has injured the plaintiff.”192 But
because the officer named in Molina’s lawsuit was one of seventeen
officers and because the plaintiff failed to specifically articulate a
conspiracy among the officers, the court boldly asserted that, “[n]o
jury could reasonably infer . . . that [the named officer] caused the
damage to the truck.”193 In so doing, the court refused to acknowledge
the important role a jury plays—that of making credibility
determinations at trial.
Thus, under the pretense of Colbert’s inability to satisfy the causal
connection requirement, the court ignored the specific circumstances
of Colbert’s case and held that because Colbert had not specifically
alleged “anything like a ‘conspiracy of silence’ . . . no jury could
reasonably conclude that these particular Defendant Officers had any
individual involvement in Colbert’s alleged property damage.”194 This
most recent holding evidences a willingness to dismiss cases in which
a plaintiff has offered undisputed direct evidence of extensive property
damage as a result of an unreasonable search and circumstantial
187

Id.
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F. 3d 963 (7th Cir. 2003).
192
Id. at 974.
193
Id.
194
Colbert v. City of Chicago et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2017).
188
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evidence supporting the plaintiff’s argument that the officers failed to
intervene on the pretense that no reasonable juror would believe the
plaintiff standing before him. Regardless of the underlying intent, the
resultant principle is that in cases in which a plaintiff is unable, due to
the searching officers’ own conduct, to provide evidence of an
officer’s direct involvement in the alleged misconduct, that claim
necessarily must fail unless that plaintiff specifically pleads a
conspiracy of silence in his or her complaint.
Recognizing the paradox of its assertion that plaintiffs in
Colbert’s situation are required to plead a specific phrase in order to
survive summary judgment, the majority explicitly refuted the natural
implication of its holding by stating “[t]his is not to suggest that
plaintiffs in this context must plead a legal theory.”195 Rather, the
court indicated, those plaintiffs must plead a claim that plausibly
forms a causal connection between the officer sued and some alleged
misconduct and introduce facts that give rise to a genuine dispute
regarding that connection, bringing the impossibility of producing
such evidence full circle.196 As such, the Seventh Circuit majority’s
conclusion left much to be desired, particularly because Colbert’s
evidentiary showing seemed to meet that stated requirement.
Colbert’s alternative argument alleging that the named officers at
the very least failed to intervene was met with the same fate. The
Seventh Circuit erroneously concluded that the Colbert’s case was
easily distinguishable from its precedent, Miller v. Smith,197 based on
no more than a circumstantial technicality.198 This artificial
differentiation evidenced the majority’s refusal to take a critical look
at the facts of a specific civil rights plaintiff’s case using a “totality of
the circumstances” approach, preferring instead to boil down those
195

Id.
Id.
197
Miller v. Smith, 220 F. 3d 491 (7th Cir. 2000).
198
The majority seemed to differentiate the facts of Miller from those of
Colbert based on the fact that, though the plaintiff in Miller “could not identify
which of the two officers had used excessive force, he did identify the remaining for
officers who stood by and, as a result, ignored a realistic opportunity to intervene.”
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 660 (emphasis in the original).
196
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facts and place the respective plaintiff in a category into which he may
or may not belong. As a result, the court found that Colbert’s assertion
that the four named Defendant Officers caused the damage, or at least
failed to intervene when they had a realistic opportunity to do so,
proven in part by circumstances such as the loud volume of the
destructive search coupled with the undisputedly small home, was
simply insufficient to dispute the Defendant Officers’ respective
claims that “it wasn’t me.”
B. Judge David Hamilton’s Dissent
The first sentence of Judge David Hamilton’s dissenting opinion
in Colbert v. Chicago summarily described the majority’s error,
stating “[t]he factual account provided by Crutcher and Colbert may or
may not be true, but that question is not before us.”199 Implicitly
attacking the rose-tinted glasses with which the majority read the
Defendant Officers’ barebones denial of all responsibility, Judge
Hamilton reminded his colleagues that their duty in reviewing
summary judgments is to treat the evidence of the nonmoving party as
true and give them the benefit of all reasonable inferences from that
evidence.200 Further, recognizing the gravity of the issue presented,
Judge Hamilton properly framed the case at bar as one which raises
larger questions about how courts should address claims of law
enforcement misconduct, putting special emphasis on claims brought
by people of color, who are disproportionately subject to police
misconduct.201 For Judge Hamilton, the issues raised in Colbert almost
exclusively involved credibility determinations, which the majority
either resolved themselves or summarily avoided by standing behind a
proverbial shield of procedure.
First, Judge Hamilton took issue with the majority’s suggestion
that plaintiffs who hope to survive summary judgment after being
subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure during which they are
199

Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 661 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
Id.
201
Id.
200
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effectively blindfolded should, in general, allege a “conspiracy of
silence” to strengthen their claim.202 Recognizing that the majority’s
suggestion was founded on Hessel and Molina, Judge Hamilton
clarified that nothing in those cases stood for the proposition that
plaintiffs in Colbert’s position are required to meet a new pleading
requirement.203 As a result, compelling a civil rights plaintiff to plead
a fact patently obvious to every Chicago resident would require that
plaintiff to interpret the Seventh Circuit’s suggestion as an actual
pleading and/or evidentiary prerequisite. Yet neither Hessel nor
Molina took a firm stance on that issue, and by categorizing Colbert as
a Hessel/Molina case, the Seventh Circuit majority failed to recognize
critical differences between those factual scenarios.
The fourteen officers in Hessel conducted a search of plaintiffs’
premises for evidence of illegal gambling pursuant to a valid
warrant.204 Plaintiffs claimed that the officers exceeded the scope of
that warrant and stole items of property, including three cans of soda,
an antique chest and an envelope with six hundred dollars of cash
inside.205 Declining to reverse the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment for the officers, the Seventh Circuit cited a “controversial
decision” that came out of a case in California, in which the court held
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be used to thwart a
“conspiracy of silence” of medical personnel.206 Importantly, however,
the Seventh Circuit concluded Hessel by stating, “[w]hether any such
approach might have been used by the plaintiffs in this case we need
not decide.”207
Further, in Molina, the court refused to credit plaintiffs’ attempt to
name the officer they believed to be responsible for causing damage to
their truck during the search.208 In so doing, however, the court stated
202

Id. at 662 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
Id.
204
Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992).
205
Id.
206
Id. at 305 (citing Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486 (1944)).
207
Hessel, 977 F. 2d at 305.
208
See Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F. 3d 963 (7th Cir. 2003).
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that the facts of the plaintiffs’ case bore “a strong resemblance to those
in Hessel,”209 thereby denying differentiation based on a “complete
inability” in Hessel versus the “likely culprit” in Molina. What’s more,
the only reference the Seventh Circuit made to a supposed pleading
requirement in Molina was when they noted that the plaintiffs “ha[d]
not alleged a conspiracy of silence among the officers (a move that
might have strengthened their argument that Hessel is
inapplicable).”210
Moreover, the majority’s “conspiracy” suggestion stands in stark
contrast to the recognized principle that a plaintiff is not required to
plead legal theories in his complaint and is inherently ironic given the
immeasurably liberal pleading requirements applied to claims for
conspiracy in the Seventh Circuit.211 In fact, by asserting that Colbert
should have explicitly alleged a “conspiracy of silence,” the Seventh
Circuit majority implicitly admitted the impossibility of Colbert’s
situation. Because conspiracies are “by their nature shrouded in
mystery,” courts have found that they “do not permit the plaintiff to
allege, with complete particularity, all of the details of the conspiracy
or the exact role of the defendants in the conspiracy.”212 A plaintiff
cannot be required to “allege facts with precision where the necessary
information to do so is within the knowledge and control of the
defendant and unknown to the plaintiff.”213
As a result, states under the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction merely
require a plaintiff to allege the parties involved, the general purpose,
and the approximate date of the conspiracy.214 Colbert incontrovertibly
surpassed those minimal requirements. Further, Colbert’s brief
explicitly stated that because both Plaintiffs expect each Defendant
209

Id. at 973.
Id. at 974.
211
Walker v. Thompson, 288 F. 3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating “it is
enough in pleading a conspiracy merely to indicate the parties, the general purpose,
and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.”).
212
Adcock v. Brakegate Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 65-66 (1994) (emphasis added).
213
Id. at 66.
214
Loubster v. Thacker, 440 F. 3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2006).
210
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Officer to deny wrongdoing, the jury should be permitted to assess the
credibility of those claims. “It is unclear,” Judge Hamilton opined,
“what else Colbert should have said to assert a ‘conspiracy of
silence.’”215
Judge Hamilton then contended that the majority also improperly
denied Colbert’s claim that at a minimum, the four named officers
failed to intervene when their fellow officers searched his home in an
unreasonable manner. The majority stated that Colbert’s claim failed
because he did not observe the officers failing to intervene. Noting that
requiring an aggrieved plaintiff to observe officers failing to intervene
would be a marked departure from circuit precedent, Judge Hamilton
criticized the majority for its inconsistent and conflicting evidentiary
requirements applied to individual liability under that theory.216
In Miller v. Smith, the district court granted summary judgment to
police officers on plaintiff’s claim of excessive force because Miller
was unable to “identify the officers who allegedly attacked him or
otherwise support his claim with sufficient facts.”217 The Seventh
Circuit reversed, concluding, “[i]f Miller can show at trial that an
officer attacked him where another officer ignored a realistic
opportunity to intervene, he can recover.”218 The majority in Colbert
attempted to differentiate Miller based on the fact that Miller
“narrowed his excessive force allegation to two of the six arresting
officers”219 and was able to identify the remaining four officers who
stood by.220 Though Colbert narrowed his unreasonable search claim
to four of the ten officers who were present during the search, this was
not enough for the majority. Failing to understand the way in which
215

Colbert v. City of Chicago et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 662 (7th Cir. 2017)
(Hamilton, J. dissenting).
216
Id. at 664 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v. Smith, 220 F. 3d 491
(7th Cir. 2000) (“An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of
§1983 if she acts or fails to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.”)).
217
Miller, 220 F. 3d at 493.
218
Id. at 495.
219
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 661 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
220
Id. at 660.
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the two cases were distinguishable, Judge Hamilton argued that the
Seventh Circuit should have taken the same approach to Colbert’s
unreasonable search claim as it did to that of Miller.221
If it had, the result would have been quite different for Colbert.
Taking an approach consistent with Seventh Circuit precedent, Judge
Hamilton analyzed the issue using the totality of the circumstances and
pointed to factors such as the officers’ testimony, in which they stated
that Colbert’s home was “a very small residence” and testimony that
the officers’ search was “incredibly loud and disruptive, as one might
expect when doors are torn from their hinges” to conclude that the four
Defendant Officers must have been close to any other officer in the
home.222 The Seventh Circuit required no more than that in Miller, yet
inexplicably came to the opposite result in Colbert, finding Colbert’s
case more similar to a case in which plaintiff complained about a
stolen soda223 and one which involved a search of a truck,224 not a
residence. Moreover, Judge Hamilton highlighted the dispositive issue
of credibility the majority implicitly resolved, noting, “while the
defendants might argue that they did not notice their colleagues in the
next room putting holes in the walls, the plausibility of that argument
should be a jury issue.”225
Thus, rejecting the majority’s “conspiracy” suggestion, Judge
Hamilton ventured to find a legitimate and instructive solution to a
plaintiff’s predictable problem. In contrast to the majority, Judge
Hamilton found persuasive the burden-shifting approach, which has
been used in other circuits facing similar evidentiary issues and was
propounded by Colbert.226227 In Burley v. Gagacki, the Sixth Circuit
221

Id. at 664 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 655 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
223
Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992).
224
Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F. 3d 963, 973 (7th Cir. 2003).
225
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 665 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
226
The majority summarily dismissed Colbert’s proposed burden-shifting
approach for two reasons: (1) the Seventh Circuit has never adopted such an
approach; and (2) even using a burden-shifting approach, Colbert “at least would
have needed to have sued all of the officers he had reason to believe were
responsible for the alleged property damage.” Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 659.
222
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permitted the district court to shift the burden of production on remand
from plaintiff to defendants after the involved officers masked their
identities before ransacking the plaintiff’s home, stating “while an
officer’s mere presence at the scene of the search is insufficient” to
establish individual liability under §1983, “here the agents’ intent to
conceal contributed to plaintiffs’ impaired ability to identify them.”228
Judge Hamilton then cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dubner
v. City and County of San Francisco,229 to clarify that such an
approach is only a procedural adjustment, which shifts the burden of
production based on the defendants’ own actions when they act
together.230 Under this approach, a defendant seeking summary
judgment is required to present evidence that he is not personally
liable for the unreasonable search, either by identifying who caused
the damage or through some other means. Importantly, if the officers
fail to present exculpatory evidence, Judge Hamilton argued, the
matter should proceed to trial so a jury can evaluate credibility.231
With regard to Crutcher’s malicious prosecution claim, Judge
Hamilton condemned the uncritical approach the majority took to
conclude that Crutcher’s grand jury indictment broke the requisite
chain of causation between Willingham and the alleged constitutional
deprivation for two reasons. First, Judge Hamilton correctly clarified
that Crutcher’s claim was based not on a wrongful arrest, but on
Willingham’s alleged lie after the officers arrested him.232 Therefore,
Crutcher’s claim was by definition premised on the malicious steps
Willingham took to ensure Crutcher’s prosecution. Crutcher alleged
227

Id. at 663 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F. 3d 610, 622 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
229
Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F. 3d 959, 965 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that “although the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the unlawful
arrest, she can make a prima facie case simply by showing that the arrest was
conducted without a valid warrant. At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to
provide some evidence that the arresting officers had probable cause for a
warrantless arrest.”).
230
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 664.
231
Id. at 663-64 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
232
Id. at 665 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
228
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that Willingham signed his name to his arrest report, knowing that the
report contained a patently false admission that formed the basis of
one of the elements of both crimes for which Crutcher was charged.
Accordingly, the chain of causation remained intact after Crutcher’s
indictment in his second criminal proceeding.
Second, Judge Hamilton criticized the Seventh Circuit majority
for refusing to confront the implausibility of its assumption.233
According to the majority, the prosecutor seeking the indictment for
knowing possession of a firearm that was found in Colbert’s locked
bedroom never presented the grand jury with information that
Crutcher had confessed he knew the gun was in the home.234 Notably,
the majority remained silent as to what other evidence the prosecutor
could have offered that would have provided the probable cause
necessary to indict Crutcher on charges requiring actual or
constructive possession. As Judge Hamilton correctly noted,
Willingham’s arrest report was the prosecutor’s “only evidence [in the
record presented] that Crutcher knew about the gun in Colbert’s
bedroom closet.”235 Consequently, finding it unlikely that a competent
prosecutor would have failed to present that evidence to the grand
jury, Judge Hamilton criticized the majority for making “such an
improbable assumption in favor of the defense” in reviewing summary
judgment for the defense.236
Finally, the majority’s disposal of Crutcher’s claim based on the
grand jury indictment allowed it to avoid addressing Defendant
Officers’ argument that they had probable cause to arrest Crutcher.
Whether Willingham reasonably believed that Crutcher either
knowingly resided in a home with or actually or constructively
possessed a firearm was one of the most hotly contested of the
aforementioned disputed facts, the truth of which only a jury could

233

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
235
Id. (emphasis in the original).
236
Id.
234
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determine.237 Understanding the pivotal role the probable cause
analysis played in Crutcher’s malicious prosecution claim, Judge
Hamilton took it upon himself to respond to Defendant Officers’
probable cause argument.238
There were two genuine disputes of material fact that the majority
simply avoided by finding a broken chain of causation. That chain of
causation would have remained intact, however, had the majority
declined to implicitly resolve several credibility determinations in
favor of Willingham. First, Crutcher claimed that he did not know
about the gun that was found in Colbert’s locked bedroom.239
Willingham, by contrast, claimed that Crutcher confessed to
knowing.240 Crutcher then testified denying that claim.241 Because
Crutcher’s “knowledge” of the gun was highly relevant to whether
Crutcher could have been found in constructive possession of a
firearm, this conflicting evidence, Judge Hamilton concluded,
presented a genuine issue of material fact.242
Second, Defendant Officers attempted to lessen the impact of that
genuine issue of material fact by arguing that the tip Willingham
received about Crutcher being seen with a gun from a cooperating
individual, combined with the corroborating evidence—the discovery
of the gun itself—was also sufficient to establish probable cause.243
Yet by relying on that cooperating individual, the majority’s holding
showed a willingness to ignore several facts that called Willingham’s
version of events into question. In fact, there existed significant

237

See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring,
Stevens J., dissenting) (stating “[w]hether a reasonable officer could have believed
he had probable cause is a question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment or a
directed verdict in a §1983 action based on the lack of probable cause is proper only
if there is only one reasonable conclusion a jury could reach.”).
238
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 665-66 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
239
Id. 666 (Hamilton, J. dissenting).
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
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problems in Willingham’s testimony about the “cooperating
individual.”244
The parties did not dispute the fact that Willingham failed to
provide any details about the purported reliability of the individual,
“despite fervent questioning by Plaintiff’s counsel,”245 which forced
the district court to treat the individual as an “anonymous tipster.”246
An anonymous tipster, without more, is insufficient at law to establish
probable cause.247 Worse yet, neither the majority nor the district court
addressed the genuine dispute as to which came first, the search or the
supposed tip.248 Willingham provided no evidence of the tip prior to
the search. In fact, Willingham’s arrest report did not even document
the alleged tip.249 Rather, the first mention of that tip was in
Willingham’s case incident report, which was drafted after Crutcher
was taken into custody—a fact that was compounded by Crutcher’s
sworn testimony in which he stated that when the officers first arrived
they were searching not for guns but for drugs.250
Taken together, those determinations evidenced the Seventh
Circuit majority’s perfunctory acceptance of the Defendant Officers’
version of events as undisputed despite testimonial evidence put forth
by the nonmoving party that called the veracity of the officers’
testimony into question. The facts of Colbert, like those of Tolan,
considered together, thus lead to the “inescapable conclusion” that the
majority credited the evidence of the party seeking summary
judgment—Chicago Police Officers—and failed to properly consider
key evidence offered by the non-moving party—two black men, one
244

Id.
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id. As discussed infra, Crutcher supported his allegation that the officers
were looking for drugs with specific statements Willingham made and actions the
Defendant Officers took, including that Willingham said he had received a tip that
“[they] had some drugs,” specifically cocaine, and searched through the sugar in
Colbert’s kitchen. Id.
245
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with a criminal conviction, living in a predominantly black
neighborhood. In so doing, the court neglected to adhere to the
fundamental principle that “at the summary judgment stage, all facts
and the reasonable inferences therefrom should be drawn in favor of
the nonmoving party.”251
CONCLUSION
While the Department of Justice’s Investigation of the Chicago
Police Department and the events preceding it have triggered the
Mayor’s promise to redouble the City’s efforts to combat police
misconduct,252 that type of response from the city’s chief executive is
far from novel. The Chicago Police Department has cycled in and out
of the national consciousness almost since its inception, yet its
practices apparently have remained unchanged. Further, as the DOJ
stated, “[w]hen officers falsify reports and affirmatively lie in
interviews and testimony, this goes well beyond any passive code of
silence; it constitutes a deliberate, fundamental, and corrosive
violation of CPD policy that must be dealt with independently and
without reservation if the City and the CPD are genuine in their efforts
to have a functioning system of accountability that vindicates the
rights of individuals who are abused by CPD officers.”253
Thus, while it is encouraging that public outrage has forced the
City to yet again commit to structural changes within the CPD, if we
have learned anything from Chicago’s history, it is that the type of
change this City so desperately needs will require cooperation from
each branch of government. Included in that is the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Yet the way in which the Seventh
Circuit has handled factual disputes between police officers defendants
251

Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILL., supra note 1, 19 (Mayor Rahm Emmanuel responded
by establishing the Police Accountability Task Force (PATF) and charged PATF
with assessing and making recommendation for change in five years, including
“oversight and accountability.”). Id.
253
Id. at 75.
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and civil rights plaintiffs based largely upon incomplete pretrial
records only perpetuates the already near impossible task of holding
officers accountable for misconduct.
As meritorious claims of officer misconduct continue to be
disposed of in the pretrial phases of litigation, officers are afforded the
opportunity to patrol the streets of Chicago with a judicially fortified
shield against liability for their unlawful actions. The judiciary must
work together with the executive branch in order to effect meaningful
change, rather than merely accepting officer misconduct—both prior
and subsequent to an arrest—as an immutable trait inherent in the
CPD. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit must heed the DOJ’s warnings
against allowing and effectively encouraging officer misconduct to
continue and resist the temptation to use procedural tools to validate
the perfunctory grant of deference to Chicago Police Officers. At the
very least, the Seventh Circuit must decline the invitation to go beyond
the traditional summary judgment inquiry and instead allow
meritorious claims of police misconduct to go to a jury.
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